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ABSTRACT
Previousresearch has suggested that firms in a number of industries
have considerable market power, in the sense that their prices exceed
their marginal costs. However, the observed profits of those industries
are not nearly as high as would occur under full exploitation of the market
power with a constant returns technology. Rather, because of fixed costs
associated with a minirnumn scale of operation or for other reasons,
industry equilibriumn occurs at a point where no abnormal returns are
earned, even though market power exists. This inference is supported by
an empirical study that shows that most industries hold capital far beyond
the point that would minimize cost given their actual output. In this






Economists have long suspected that a number of industries holdexcess
capacity or capital stock. Over the 38 years from 1948 through 1985,
the Federal Reserve Board's index ofcapacity utilization in manufacturing
has averaged only 82 percent--in the typicalyear, output has stood
18 percent below the feasible level chosen torepresent 100 percent.
Only in one year, 1966, did capacity utilization reach as high as 90
percent. The last year in which utilization exceeded 85 percent was
1973.
Theorists have contributed two main explanations for chronicexcess
capacity: First, Chamberlin's (1933) model of monopolistic competition
and its refinements such as Sperice (1976) and Dixit andStiglitz (1977)
suggest that firms may each retain monopoly power even though entry
proceeds to the point of zero expected profit. In the resulting
equilibrium, firms operate with declining average cost. Under certain
conditions, the equilibrium may involve excess capacity according to a
reasonable definition. Second, Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980),
with many successors, have shown that the incumbent firmenjoying profit
from a monopoly or oligopoly positionmay choose to hold excess capacity
in order to deter entry. The reserve capacity lowers the expected profit
of the potential entrant, provided the incumbent's threat touse the
capacity after entry is credible.
Existing evidence on excess capacity is far from conclusive. As De
Vany and Frey (1982) have argued, the firm that chooses its capacity so
as to minimize expected cost may well hold excess capacity most of the
1time. The large cost saving during the occasional periodwhen it is
profitable to produce large volumes of output may justify holding capacity
that is idle most of the time. Moreover, the benchmark for the
measurement of capacity in the first place is inherently ill-defined.
Though the Federal Reserve and other compilers of capacityutilization
data attempt to measure capacity in the sense of a fully practical level of
production, there is always the possibility of an upwardbias in their
measures of capacity. Finally, if there is scope forsmooth substitution
between labor and capital, then the concept of capacity is not even defined
as a matter of theory. The definition of capacity asthe point of minimum
short-run average cost, as proposed by Berndt and Morrison (1981), is
essentially arbitrary; it does not emerge naturally from a theoryof
optimal choice of capacity.
My work on this question starts with an unambiguousdefinition of
excess capacity: A firm has excess capacity whenthe expected marginal
benefit of capital falls short of the service price of capital. Because
equality of expected marginal benefit and service price isthe first-order
condition for cost-minimization, a firm with excess capacity, according to
this definition, is one that is not minimizing expected cost.
By setting a definition of excess capacity within aformal stochastic
model of the firm, it is possible to deal rigorously with the potentially
important role of Jensen's inequality. AsDe Vany and Frey have
suggested, a firm may rationally choose to hold alevel of capacity in
excess of its expected level of output, inwhich case its average level of
capacity utilization may be well under100 percent. However, a firm in
that situation should still equate the expected marginal benefitof capital
to its service price, unless one of the factors mentionedabove causes it
2to hold true excess capacity.
The decision I examine here is the choice ofcapital stock as part of a
general strategy that determines the level of output as well. The
firm is viewed as minimizingexpected cost given the probability
distribution for future output generated by thestrategy. The optimal
capital stock has a very simple property: Theaverage value of the
marginal benefit of capital over a span of years should equal the rental
price of capital.
Although I examine the investment decision conditional on the
distribution of future output, I do not consideroutput an exogenous
variable. Rather, I proceed in thisway in order to isolate the investment
decision from the other decisions made by the firm. Thestrategy is
similar to Jorgenson's (1963) investment theory,except that h considers
the investment decision conditional on the nominal value of the firm's
sales, rather than on its real output.
The paper proceeds in the followingway: It characterizes the optimal
capacity of a cost-minimizing firm with market power, under the
assumptions of constant returns to scale and the absence ofany motive for
holding capacity other than the minimization of cost. The hypothesis that
U.S. industries hold the optimal amount ofcapacity, judged by this
standard, is overwhelmingly rejected. My interpretation of therejection
is that either constant returns fails because fixed costsare important, or
that firms hold capacity to deter entry or forsome other reason other
than to produce at least cost.
My characterization of the cost-minimizing, constant returns firm
makes no assumptions about the functional form of the costor production
functions of the firm. The intuition of the method is thefollowing: Think
-pof the firm as divided into a production department and a marketing
department. The production departmentsells its output to the marketing
department at a price equal to marginal cost.The marketing department
sells to the public at a higher price incorporating a markup.The markup
ratio is the ratio of the price to marginal cost. Theactual marginal
benefit of capital is just the profit rate of the production departmentwhen
its output is valued at marginal cost.
If marginal cost were observed directly, then the calculationsof this
paper would be elementary.I would calculate the realized profit of the
production department each year, and comparethe profit rate to the
service price of capital as perceived earlier when the investmentdecision
relevant for this year was made. If the realized profit rate was generally
lower, I would conclude that the firm held excess capacity.
Only a noisy measure of marginal cost isavailable directly from the
data. My earlier work on the relation between price and marginal cost,
Hall (1986), derived a measure of marginal cost based on changes incost
that occur from year to year as output changes. It also showedhow to
estimate the markup ratio as a constant parameter. Oneof the methods
used here infers marginal cost by dividing the observed price bythe
estimated markup ratio. The result is nothing more than a smoothed
version of the marginal cost measure than can be derived directlyfrom
the data.
When the profit rate of the production departments of firms in
manufacturing are calculated in this way, it turns out tobe negative in
every year since1949. Under the maintained assumptions of this paper,
the conclusion is unambiguous that these industries have chronic excess
capacity. They are not choosing their capitilstocks to minimize expected
4cost with constant returns. Rather, their productive unitsare larger than
would be chosen under constant returns, because ofa minimum scale
requirement, or capital has some other benefit in addition to lowering the
cost of production. It is held to deterentry, to attract customers, or for
some other reason unrelated to production.
The second approach I use in thispaper makes use of the noisy direct
measure of marginal cost. Estimation and hypothesis testing is setup in
a formal stochastic framework that takes account of both the noise in the
measure of marginal cost and the error in the marginal benefit of capital.
I estimate theaverage value of the marginal benefit of capital over the
sample period; in almost all industries the average falls short of its
theoretical level and, indeed, is negative in thegreat majority. The
hypothesis of cost-minimization with constant returns is rejected
decisively in 12 of the 20 industries. Then Igo on to characterize the
magnitude of the failure of cost minimization by defining a parameter that
measures the shortfall of the marginal benefit of capital from its
theoretical value, expressed as a fraction of thegap that would exist
under zero expected profit. In themajority of industries, the marginal
benefit of capital is found to be between 70percent and 100 percent of
the way from its value under cost minimization to its value underzero
profit.
The controversial element in these calculation is theimputation of
marginal cost. There do not seem to be any other aspects that are
particularly vulnerable to specification errors, data errors, or other
sources of bias. Hence, the persuasive power of thispaper hangs on the
argument in my earlier paper that marginal cost has been correctly
rn easured.
5Figure 1. illustrates the relationship among the issues and tests
considered in this and my earlier paper. The two axes describe the two
quantitative dimensions of the studies. On the horizontal axis is market
power, measured by the markup of price over marginal cost.On the
vertical axis is the degree of excess capacity, measured by the shortfall of
the marginal benefit of capital from its cost-minimizing level. The
diagonal line divides the plane into a region of negative profit, above and to
the lefht, and a region of positive profit. Firms are unlikely to be
observed for any length of time in the region of negative profit. A firm
that is able to protect its market power by effective methods might be
observed to be chronically in the region of postive profit. If a firm is
unable to deter entry, or can only do do by surrendering all of its monopoly
profit, then the firm will wind up along the diagonal, with zero profit.
One of the most interesting questions answered in the current paper is
whether the process of competing away profit also eliminates market
power. If so, firms should be observed mainly nearthe origin, where
there is no excess capacity or market power. I show that in most
inudstries, pure profit is close to zero, but market power is considerable.
That is, the typical firm examined here and in my previous paper occupies





Figure 1. Two dimensions of industry structure.
Earlier research measured the horizontal position of a number of industries,
measuring monopoly power by the markup of price over marginal cost. The
present paper measures the vertical position of the same industries, measuring










Competi tionFirms hold substantial amounts of excess capacity. I offer the conjecture
that most excess capacity arises from the fixed costs of a minimum scale
of production, but the results presented here do not try to distinguish
among the alternative sources of excess capacity.
1.Theory
Afirm uses capital K and labor N to produce output Q.Itsshort-run
cost function is:
(1.1) C(Q,K,w) =wL(Q,K)
L(Q,K) is the labor requirement to produce Qwithcapital K; w is the
wage. The firm has constant returns to scale, sothat L(Q,K) is
homogeneous of degree one in QandK.
The firm knows its future factor costs but is uncertain about future
demand, which is influenced by a random variable q. The firm picks an
output strategy(rij,. . . , q)and a investment stragegy Kt .
contingenton the observed realizations of ri.Notethat output can respond
to the most recent information but there is a lag, r, in the response of
capacity to new information; tisthe time to build. One of the criteria
for an optimal strategy is that the investment strategy minimize the
expected discounted value of total cost given the output strategy:
8(1.2) Miri E {Rt [w Lt Kt) +rtK] }
Theexpectation is conditional upon all information known to the firm at
the time it picks the strategy. A fullyoptimal strategy will be time-
consistent--it will minimize the remaining future expected discounted cost
as of any time period. Thus, it is notnecessary to consider the
conditional expectations midway through theprocess. The work presented




whichI will call the marginal benefit of capital. Then
(1.4) E(z) =I
The proof follows immediately by considering perturbations around the
optimal investment strategy, taking derivatives with respect to the
perturbations, and then setting the perturbations to zero.
The expectation is conditional on the same information available to the
firm when it chooses its strategy. The basicmessage of the theorem is
simple: An investigator who calculates the marginal benefit of capital
after the fact will find that itsaverage value is one. If its average value
is consistently below one, the firm is holding too much capital to be
consistent with cost minimization and constant returns.
9One could find more elaborate characterizations of optimal investment
strategies. For example, the expectation of z conditional oninformation
available in year t -rshould also be one. However, the results obtained
here rejecting even the simplest characterization are so strong that there
is no good reason to examine other characterizations. The advantage of my
procedure is expressed in the following
Corollary(Irrelevanceof Time to Build). For any value of r, E(z) =I
for all periods in which output is produced.
Thus, the troublesome issue of lags in the investment process can be
sidestepped by looking only at the average of the marginal benefit of
capital and not its correlation with other variables.
The basic condition examined here requires that the expected marginal
benefit of capital (in labor units) is equal to the rental price of capital, r,
divided by the wage. Equivalently, the ratio of the marginal benefit of
capital to the rental cost differs from one by an error, E, with mean zero:
(1.5)
The marginal benefit of capital can be measured directly from the data
without making assumptions about the functional form of the cost function.
Under constant returns,
16QL KaL_1 (.)
Letx denote marginal cost:
10(1.)x=w-
Inserting this into equation 1.6 and solving for the marginalbenefit of
capital, z, gives:
(18)w3L_xQ-wN —raK rK
The realized marginal benefit of capital is gross profit per unit of capital
rental cost, where output is valued at marginal cost instead of price.
Call the markup ratio of price to marginal cost p. Then x can be
replaced in equation 1.8 by p/p, yielding:
-pQ -w (1.9) z=rK
Minimization of expected cost implies that E(z) =1--thedepartures of
marginal benefit from rental cost have mean zero. If the technologyhas a
minimum practical scale, or some factor other than cost minimization
motivates investment, so the firm has chronic excess capacity, then z
will be consistently below one.
My earlier work--Hall (1986)--estimated values ofthe markup ratio p
for a number of industries. One of the measures of chronic excess
capacity computed later in this paper usesthose estimates in equation 1.9
to estimate the marginal benefit of capital.
The basic finding of this paper is that a number of U.S. industries
11operate with chronic excess capacity. In those industries, marginal cost
is low; the typical firm can expandoutput without encountering a capacity
constraint or a steeply rising part of its marginal cost curve. A
significant amount of labor input is overhead labor. Capacityconsistently
has a negative marginal benefit because it is staffed with labor butis not
fully utilized.
The technique to be used to test hypotheses aboutexcess capacity does
not make the assumption that the markup ratio,p, is a constant. Rather,
it uses the measure of marginal cost that underliesmy earlier estimates
of p. Equation 1.4 frommy earlier paper states a measure based on first
differences of inputs and output. In the notation of thispaper, it is:
wN +rzK (1.10) X=
eQ
Thefirst term in the numerator is the actual change inwage cost less the
part of the change attributable to change in the wage. The second term is
the imputed cost of the change in the capital stock,abstracting from
changes in the rental price. The denominator is the actual change in output
less the amount attributable to technicalprogress at rate e.
Equation1.8 gives the marginal benefit or shadow value ofcapital in
terms of marginal cost. Equation 1.10 gives marginal cost in terms of
the shadow price of capital. The two equations can be solved for thetwo
variables. For z, the result is:
—a*An+Og I1.iI) z—
— — ê
12Here a *islabor's cost share:
wNw +r
Also, L ri is the proportional rate of change in the labor-capital ratio (in
=log (N/K) and q is the proportional change in the output-capital
ratio. The hypothesis of cost minimization requires that the z in equation
1.11 differ from unity by an error with mean zero.
Let be the mean of z. Estimation of and its standard error will
provide the test of the hypothesis of no excess capacity. The statistical
model is
cr* n+O-g -
(1.13) 1a* Aq - = Z + E
Because0 is a random variable, this form is not satisfactory for




The left-hand side of this equation is a productivity residual similar to the
one proposed by Solow (1956). However, Solow used labor's share in
in total revenue, a =wN/pQ,as an estimate of the elasticity of output
with respect to labor input, whereas this measure uses labor's share in
cost, a*. For a firm with significant pure profit derived from market
13power, a is considerably smaller than a*. Solow's original form of the
residual was the basis for the measurement of marketpower in my earlier
work. Equation 1.14 says that the residual based instead on the cost share
can answer the question of excess capacity. A firm with procyclical
Solow productivity has marketpower. One where the productivity
measure based on the cost share is also procyclical has excess capacity.
To put it a different way, the switch from the revenue share,a, to the cost
share, a*, would eliminate the cycle in productivity for a firm possessing
market power without chronic excess capacity. A firm with market
power and excess capacity would have procyclical productivity by both
measures. In all this discussion, procyclical means that when an
exogenous force raises the firm's output, measured productivity rises as
well.
The units of the measure are the same as those of z--dollars of
marginal benefit per dollar of rental cost of capital. A value of z of zero
means that an additional unit of capital does not decrease expected cost at
all and falls 100 percent short of covering its own cost. A value of z of
-1 (which I actually find for a number of industries including total
manufacturing) means that capital adds to cost by as much as its own
rental cost, so it falls 200 percent short of covering its own cost.
Zeroexpected pure profit
Theintroduction indicated that the hypothesis of zero expectedpure
profit figured in an important way in the issues considered in this
research.. Models whtre entry takes place up to the point of zero profit
14may have the character that overinvestment in capacitydissipates the
potential profit available when price exceeds marginal cost. In
competition, where marginal cost and price are equal, cost-miminization
and zero expected profit are equivalent. Where marginal cost falls short
of price, profit is positive when the capital stock minimizes expected
cost. Zero profit involves a capital stock in excess of the cost-
minimizing level.
The condition for zero expected profit is
(1.15) =pQ-wN=I+E
rK
The difference between zero profit and cost minimization can be seen by
comparing equation 1.15 to 1.8. Cost minimization uses marginal cost,
x, to value output whereas zero profit uses actual price, p.Since ir can
be observed directly, testing the hypothesis of zero expected profit is a
simple matter of calculating i,thesampie average of ir, and testing the
hypothesis that it equals one.
Estimating thedegree ofexcesscapitalrelative to zero profit
Recall that z measures the marginal benefit of capital in its own units;
in Figure 1, 1 -zis the vertical coordinate. Another way to think about
the extent of excess capital is to measure the shortfall in the marginal
benefit of capital as a fraction of the shortfall that would drive profit to
zero. I will call this fraction y. In Figure 1, the fraction isthe ratio of
the height of the point describing firm or industry to the height of the
15diagonal line directly above the point.
Substituting the condition E(ir) =0into the definition of z yields the
value of z for which expected profit is zero:
(1.16)1- =E[(1-')]
Hereis the ratio of capital cost to revenue, rK/pQ. I have written this
condition in terms of the shortfall in the marginal benefit, I -, because
that is the quantity on the vertical axis in Figure 1. Equation 1. 16
describes the diagonal in Figure 1.
If the shortfall of the marginal benefit of capital is a fraction y of the
amount that would drive profit to zero, then
Ian (1.17)1-z =y(l
- -E
Puttingthis on the right-hand side and formula 1.11 on the left-hand side




Theexpression in parentheses on the right-hand side,q -ari, is the
Solow productivity residual or index of the increase in total factor
productivity. The similar expression on the left-hand side,q -a*ri,
is the productivity residual computed with th2 cost share a, in place of
16the revenue share, a. The equation provides information about the
parameter y from the different behavior of the two productivity
measures, as follows:
Case I. Competition. Neither productivity measure can be shifted by
any outside influence, and no information is available about y.The
distinction captured by y is meaningless in competition--both cost
minimization and expected zero profit must occur simultaneously. In
Figure 1, this corresponds to the origin.
Case Ii. Monopoly power withcost minimization. Theproductivity
measure with the revenue share, a, changes with output. Because
monopoly power means that labor is paid less than the value of its
marginal product, a understates the true elasticity of output with respect
to labor input. Even though true productivity does not change when output
and employment rise, productivity measured in this way does rise. On the
other hand, the productivity measure on the left, with the cost share a*,
measures productivity correctly, assuming cost minimization. Hence, an
exogenous change that makes output rise increases the right-handside of
equation 1. 18 but leaves the left-hand side unchanged. The parameter y is
revealed to be zero. This corresponds to the points along the horizontal
axis in Figure 1.
Case ill. Monopoly power with zero expected profit. Because cost and
revenue are equal, on the average, the cost and revenue shares, a*anda,
are equal, on the average, and the two measures of productivity are
essentially the same. Monopoly power makes both measures rise by the
same amount when output rises. Hence y is shown to be equal to one.
This corresponds to points along the diagonal in Figure 1.
172. identification and estimation
As in my earlier work, it seems reasonable to portray the rate of
productivity growth, e,asthe sum of a constant and a random element, u.







The equation for estimating the average value of the marginal benefit of
capital, z, is
(2.5)f =(1-) q+0h -(1-) 0+hu -(q-6)e +ue
The shortfall, 1 -, issimply the coefficient of the rate of change of
output when the left-hand variable is the productivity residual computed
18with the cost share, a*.
The equation for estimating the normalized measure of the degree of
excess capacity, y, is
(2.6) f =yg+Oh-yOj+(h-yj)u
-(q-0)e+UE
Ifcapacity is chosen to minimize expected cost, then y will be zero. If
there is chronic excess capacity, so the marginal benefit of capital is
consistently below the rental price of capital, then y will be positive.
Identification of and y hinges on the availability of an observed
variable that causes important changes in employment and output in the
industry but is not correlated with the disturbances in equations 2.5 and
2.6. With respect to the industry's own productivity shift, u, the issues
here are the same as in my earlier paper estimating the markup ratio. If
the main sources of overall economic fluctuations are shifts in product
demands and factor supplies, not in productivity, then a macro aggregate,
specifically the change in real GNP, is suitable as an instrument. On the
other hand, if a a major cause of fluctuations is a pattern of correlated
shifts in productivity among many industries, then real GNP is not a
suitable instrument for any industry. My untested identifying hypothesis
is that the productivity disturbance, u, is uncorrelated with the change in
real GNP.
Another part of the disturbance in the two equations is the product of
output growth and the surprise in the marginal benefit of capital, (iq-
9)€.Bothof these variables are highly correlated with the change in real
GNP. Unexpected increases in product demand are probably the most
important source of
19favorable surprises about the marginal benefit of capital. However, the
product of the two variables is only slightly correlated with the change in
real GNP,y. If the mean of the growth rate of the output-capital ratio,
q, were exactly 0, and ifq -0,€, and iyall had symmetric
distributions, then the correlation would be exactly zero. Basically, ( q -
0)E is positive for both negative and positive surprises, whereas y
changes sign, so the expectation of the product is zero. Hence the change
in real GNP satisfies the conditions needed for eligibility as an instrument
under very general conditions.
The estimator I use is Amemiya's (1977) nonlinear three-stage least
squares estimator, with the contemporaneous change in real GNP as the
instrument. The estimator is applied to the two-equation system
consisting of the equation from my earlier paper and either equation 2.5
or equation 2.6. Bivariate estimation is required because the parameter 0
appears in both equations but is hardly identified in equations 2.5 or 2.6.
3.Data andresults
Most of the data used in this study are the same as described inmy
earlier paper (Hall (1986)). These include nominal and real value added,
compensation and total hours of work, and the real capital stock. The only
series used here that was not part of the earlier work is the rental price
of capital.
Construction of the rental price follows Hall and Jorgenson (1967).
The formula relating the rental price to its determinants is:
20(3.1) r =(p+6)krd
The determinants are:
p: The firm's real cost of funds,measured as the dividend yield of
the S&P 500 portfolio;
6: The economic rate of depreciation, 0.127, obtained from
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981), Table 1, P. 179;
k: The effective rate of the investment tax credit, from Jorgenson
and Sullivan, Table 10, p. 194;
d: The present discounted value of tax deductions for depreciation,
from Jorgenson and Sullivan, Table 6, pp. 188-189;
r: The statutory corporate tax rate, from Auerbach (1983),
Appendix A;
PK:The deflator for business fixed investment from the U.S.
National Income and Product Accounts.
Use of the dividend yield as the real cost of funds is justified by two
considerations: First, the great bulk of investment is financed through
equity in the form of retained ealmings. Second, the useof a market-
determined real rate avoids the very substantial problems of deriving an
estimated real rate by subtracting expected inflation from a nominal rate.
The dividend yield is a good estimate of the real cost of equity funds
whenever the path of future dividends is expected to be proportional to the
price of capital goods. For the typical firm, this is an eminently
21reasonable hypothesis. Of course, for firms with low current dividend
payouts and high expected growth, the dividend yield understates the real
cost of funds. But these firms are counterbalanced by mature firms whose
payouts are high and whose growth rates are below the rate of inflation.
Table I shows the basic calculations of the marginal benefit of capital
in the manufacturing sector given an estimate of the markup ratio,p.
The estimate, p =1.67,is taken from my earlier paper. The first
column gives nominal value added. The second column reduces value added
to an estimate of production revenue valued at marginal cost, by dividing
by 1.67. The third column shows the level of compensation. In every
year, compensation exceeds estimated production revenue, which means
that the implicit earnings of capital are negative. The fourth column
shows the total rental value of the capital stock, rK. The fifth column
shows z, the ratio of the implicit earnings to the rental value. Under cost
minimization, z should fluctuate above and below one. Instead, it ranges
from -0.6 to -1. There is not a singleyear when z is even positive. The
evidence lends no support to the hypothesis of cost minimization.
Table 1 does not fully support the alternative hypothesis of zero
expected profit, although that hypothesis fares better than does cost
minimization. Under zero expected profit, nominal value added, in the
first column, would equal the sum of compensation, in the third column,
and the rental value of capital, in the fourth column. In fact, value added
exceeds the sum in every year, though often not by much. In 1963, for
example, nominal value added was $154 billion, while compensation was
$112 billion and the rental value of capital was $19 billion, for a total of
$131 billion. The mean of profit per unit of capital income, ir, is 1.75
with a standard error of .06, so the hypothesis of zeropure profit (mean
22Table 1. Marqinal benefit of capital in manufacturinq
Nonminal Value Compen— Rental Marginal
value at mar— sation value of benefit of
Year added ginal cost capital capital
1949 65.8 39.4 47.1 11.4
1950 76.8 46.0 53.6 12.0 --0.64
1951 91.4 54.7 63.7 13.4 —0.66
1952 94.7 56.7 68.8 14.1 -0.86
1953 103.2 61.8 76.4 15.3 —095
1954 97.9 58.6 72.9 14.5 -0.98
1955 111.5 66.7 80.0 14.6 —0.91
1956 116.5 69.8 86.1 16.6 —0.99
1957 120.9 72.4 90.2 18.7 -0.95
1958 113.5 67.9 86.4 18.4 -1.00
1959 130.2 78.0 95.7 18.3 —0.97
1960 131.8 78.9 99.4 19.3 -1.06
1961 132.1 79.1 99.6 18.9 —1.08
1962 144.9 86.8 107.8 18.7 —1.12
1963 153.7 92.0 112.3 19.0 -1.07
1964 164.9 98.7 119.8 19.4 -1.08
1965 182.6 109.3 129.3 21.1 —0.95
1966 201.9 120.9 144.3 25.2 —0.93
1967 207.2 124.1 151.2 27.5 -0.99
1968 225.8 135.2 165.2 29.9 -1.00
1969 238.0 142.5 179.5 36.3 —1.02
1970 232.4 139.1 180.9 42.8 —0.98
1971 244.7 146.5 185.0 41.1 —0.94
1972 271.0 162.3 203.6 42.2 —0.98
1973 303.2 181.6 230.4 47.4 —1.03
1974 317.4 190.0 250.1 60.4 —0.99
1975 334.1 200.1 252.4 66.7 —0.78
1976 384.9 230.5 286.1 69.2 -0.80
1977 437.6 262.0 322.9 80.4 -0.76
1978 490.4 293.6 365.1 97.3 -0.73of ir equal to one) is clearly rejected.
The conclusion expressed in Table 1 is highly sensitive to one of the
table's ingredients, the markup ratio, and hardly sensitive at all to the
others. Cost minimization fails badly because the estimated markup
ratio, p =1.67,is so high that the value of output based on imputed
marginal cost is extremely low, below even the cost of labor. Nothing in
the calculation of the rental value of capital, for example, much affects
the conclusion. No matter what series was used for the rental value, as
long as it was positive in each year, the estimated marginal benefit of
capital, z, would be negative in every year.






The standard deviation of the estimate ofp reported in my earlier paper is
0.10, so it is unlikely that sampling error alone could account for the
finding of negative z. A rigorous treatment of this question follows
shortly.
Because of the central importance of the finding that the markup ratio
in total manufacturing (and in most two-digit manufacturing industries)
considerably exceeds one, I think it is useful at this point to review the
empirical basis for that finding. Marginal cost is inferred from the
24actual change in cost from oneyear to the next, in comparison to the
change in output. In many industries, and in manufacturing as an
aggregate, the change in cost is1 quite small in comparison to the change
in output. That is, marginal cost is low relative to price.
The cost that enters these calculations is labor cost, so anotherway to
express the finding is that the variation in labor input is small relative to
the variation in output. Labor productivity is procyclical. The standard
explanations of procyclical productivity are harnomious with my conclusion
that. marginal cost is low. First, if a significant fraction of the work
force has an overhead function, then the marginal laborrequirement is low
in comparison to the average labor requirement and productivity is
procyclical. Second, if workers are hoarded during temporary cyclical
downturns, then the availability of idle workers makes the marginal cost
of labor low during any episode when employment is notgrowing.
Of the various specification errors thatmay have biased the estimate
of the markup ratio upward, the only one that seems to have thepotential
to reverse the conclusion of chronic excess capacity is the following,
considered at length in the earlierpaper: There are unmeasured
variations in work effort that are positively correlated with output. A
proper measure of marginal cost would count the cost of extra effort and
might reverse the conclusion that marginal cost is well under price. A
number of considerations convince me that unmeasured fluctuations in
effort cannot explain a bias in the estimate of the markup ratio large
enough to bring the calculated marginal benefit of capital up to its
theoretical value of unity. First, the magnitude of the fluctuations would
have to be large. Figure 2 of my earlierpaper shows that the effort of
the typical worker would have to have been almost 10percent above
25normal for a sustained period in the 1960s, for example. Second, survey
evidence collected from employers by Fay and Medoff (1985) suggests that
effort is slightly negatively correlated with output, not strongly positively,
as required to give an upward bias in the estimated markup ratio. Third,
the fluctuations in effort needed to rationalize the observed fluctuations in
productivity are inconsistent with the observed behavior of compensation.
Work effort rises so much in a boom that the wage, corrected for changes
in effort, actually falls. I find this implausible. The only way to rescue
the hypothesis of large fluctuations in work effort is to invoke the theory
of wage smoothing, in which workers are not paid on a current basis for
their labor input, but rather receive compensation based on the average
level of work over an extended period.
Testing the hypothesisof cost minimizationwithout assuming a constant
markup ratio
The findings just presented do not amount to a formal test of the
hypothesis that firms choose their capital to minimize expected cost.
They rely on an outside estimate of the markup ratio in order to infer the
level of marginal cost. Both because of the lack of formal consideration of
the saripling properties of the estimated markup ratio, and because of the
lack of any strong economic foundation for the assumption that the markup
ratio is a constant, it is desirable to carry out a self-contained test. The
basis for the test was developed in equation 1.14 in section 1. In
essence, the method diagnoses cost minimization by exploiting its
implications for cyclical fluctuations in productivity. All imperfectly
26competitive industries show procyclical productivity whenproductivity is
calculated as recommended by Solow, where theelsticity of output with
respect to labor input is inferred from the share ofcompensation in total
revenue. However, in the cost-minimizingindustry, productivity can be
measured accurately byusing labor's share in total cost, where cost is
the sum of actualcompensation and the rental value of the capital stock.
Under cost minimization,productivity measured with the cost share will
not be procyclical.
Only those changes in productivity caused by anexogenous shift in
product demand or labor supply are relevant for this calculation.Shifts
in the true underlying rate of productivitygrowth need to be omitted from
consideration. In other words, estimation of theslope must use an
instrLll-nental variable. My instrument is thechange in real GNP. Again,
my fundamental identifying hypothesis is that movements of real GNPare
dominated by factors other than thecommon element of productivity shifts
in individual industries.
Figure 2 shows the evidence on the two measures ofproductivity
growth in manufacturing, graphed against the change in real GNP. Both
measures are quite procyclical. The upward slope of the relation between
the Solow measure (plotted withsquares), which uses the revenue share,
and real GNP reflects the conclusion ofmy earlier paper that markets
are imperfect and price exceeds marginal cost. The upwardslope for the
measure based on the cost share (plotted with pluses) leads to the
conclusion that the marginal benefit of capitalconsistently falls short of


































































































































































































































































































 The results of estimating equation 2.5 by nonlinearthree-stage least
squares are:




Durbin Watson statistic: 1.76
The hypothesis of no excess capacity is overwhelminglyrejected--the
estimated average value of the marginal benefit of capital, ,is-.93
with a standard error of .24. This value is completely consistent with the
calculations in Table 1.
Equation 2.6 provides a way to interpret the finding of a negative
marginal benefit of capital in relation to the hypothesis of zero expected
pure profit. The right-hand variable is normalized so that its coefficient
is zero if there is no chronic excess capacity and one if excess capacity is
sufficient to extinguish all latent profit arising from marketpower. The
normalized right-hand variable is just Solow's productivity measure.
If the two measures move together with close to unit slope, the degree of
excess capacity is almost enough to eliminate all of the latent pure profit
from market power. In that case, the estimate ofy will be close to one.
On the other hand, if capacity is held to the cost-minimizing level, the
29lefthand variable will not move along with the right-hand variable and the
estimate of y will be close to zero.
In fact, as Figure 2 shows, the two measures of productivity
growth are very similar. Although the cost shares are alittle higher
than the revenue shares, the differences in the rates of productivity
growth are not large enough to make the slope of the onebased on the cost
share much less than the slope of the one based on the revenue share. The
two measures are almost equally procyclical. The results are
unfavorable to cost minimization and tend to support the alternative of
zero expected profit.







Durbin Watson statistic: 1.83
The results suggest that the marginal benefit of capital is about three-
quarters of the way from its theoretical valueof one (under cost
minimization) to its value if all latent monopoly profit is dissipated in
excess capacity.
30Results for two-digit industries
Table2 presents similar results for 20two-digit industries. The first
column gives the estimate of themarkup ratio of price over marginal cost
from my earlier study, Hall (1986). The secondcolumn shows the
marginal benefit of capital, estimated fromequation 2.5. In 16 of the
industries, the marginal benefit is negative. In tobacco, where the
marginal benefit of capital is absurdly high, the problem is extreme
sampling error in the estimate of p. The third column shows the Durbin-
Watson statistic for the estimation.
The fourth column of Table 2 shows theaverage level of profit per unit
of capital, i,asdefined in equation 1.15. Comparison ofto its standard
error, reported beneath it, yields a test of the hypothesis of zeropure
profit. In most industries, that hypothesis is rejecteddecisively.
Although profit is not has high as it would be under constant returns and
cost minimization, it is still higher than it would be absent marketpower.
The test here is biased toward thefinding of profit, however, because the
only element of capital cost considered is the rental cost of fixedcapital.
If a full accounting were made for inventories and financialcapital, the
calculated values of iwouldbe lower.
The fifth column of Table 2 gives the nonlinearthree-stage least
squares estimates of y. Recall that y =0corresponds to the choice of
capacity to minimize cost and y =1corresponds to zero expected profit.
In the majority of cases, the estimate ofy is between .5 and 1, and is
significantly different from both polar values.
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The data strongly refute the combination of two hypotheses: Constant
returns to scale and a level of capacity that minimizes expected cost. The
refutation is conditional on the identifying hypothesis that correlated shifts
in productivity growth across industries are not a major moving force for
total GNP.
Although the method of this paper does not make it possible to
demonstrate which of the two hypotheses fails most conspicuously, I
believe that it is probably constant returns. If many technologies have
minimum practical scales, a robust type of theory can explain why the
interaction of rationally managed firms and intelligent consumers will
generate the findings of this paper. With a minimum practical scale,
entrepreneurs will build new productive units in every market where costs
can be covered, even though capacity is excessive by the definition used in
this paper. Where markets are distinguished by geographical location or
differentiated products, the equilibrium will have a multiplicity of
productive units, each with a marginal benefit of capital below one.
It is a subtle question, one which I will not pursue here, whether the
equilibrium consistent with these empirical findings is socially optimal.
Competition is infeasible under the conditions just sketched. The social
optimum involves a proliferation of differentiated products, with the costs
of excess capacity covered by some system of taxes or charges.
33References
TakeshiAmemiya, 'The Maximum Likelihood and the Nonlinear Two-Stage
Least Squares Estimator in the General Nonlinear Simultaneous Eequation
Model,"Econometrica 45:955-968,1977
Alan J. Auerbach, "Corporate Taxation in the United States," Brook ings
Paperson Economzc Activity 2:1983, pp. 45 1-505
Ernst Berndt and Catherine Morrison, "Capacity Utilization Measures:
Underlying Economic Theory and an Alternative Approach," American
Economic ReviewPapers andProceedings 71: 48-52, May 1981
Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press), 1933
Avinash Dixit, "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic
Journal 90:95-106, March 1980
Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz, "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity," American Economic Review 67: 297-308, Juie 1977
Arthur De Vany and Gail Frey, "Backlogs and the Value of Excess Capacity
in the Steel Industry," AmericanEconomicReview 72:441-45 1, June
1982
34Jon Fay and James Medoff, "Labor and Output over the BusinessCycle,"
American Economic Review 75:638-655, September 1985
Robert E. Hall, "The Relation between Price andMarginal Cost in U.S.
Industry," Stanford, May 1986
Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, "Tax Policy and Investment
Behavior," American Economic Review 57:391-414, June 1967
Dale W. Jorgenson, "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior," American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 53:247-259, May 1963
Dale W. Jorgenson and Martin A. Sullivan, "Inflation and CorporateCapital
Recovery" in Depreciation, Inflation, and the Taxation of' Income From
Capital, Charles R. Hulten (ed.) (Washington DC: Urban Institute) 1981,
pp. 171-237
Robert M. Solow, "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production
Function, "Review & Economics and Statistics 39: 3 12-320, August
1957
A. Michael Spence, "Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic
Competition," Review of Economic Studies 43: 2 17-235, June 1976
_____________"Entry,Capacity, Investment, and Oligopolistic
Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics Autumn 1977:534-544
35